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This paper provides an economic analysis of the residential real estate brokerage 
industry. We find that the traditional model for residential real estate brokerage services may be 
dated, and could be improved substantially with some public policy interventions that spur 
innovation.  
 
We believe that there are numerous barriers to entry that are slowing the emergence of 
new models for serving consumers. Some of these barriers are likely to be anti-competitive. 
Examples include discrimination against new brokerage models and online brokers who wish to 
join multiple listing services; state legislation that would require minimum service requirements, 
effectively preventing "a la carte" offerings; and prohibitions by real estate commissions on 
providing rebates to customers. In our opinion, none of these practices should be allowed.  
 
We offer three broad policy recommendations: First, federal and state antitrust authorities 
should carefully scrutinize efforts to limit competition in the residential real estate brokerage 
market. Second, state governments should refrain from adopting laws or rules that inhibit 
competition in real estate brokerage. Third, Congress should allow the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Treasury Department to permit banks, which have long been natural potential entrants 
into this business, to offer residential real estate brokerage services through separately 
capitalized affiliates. 
 
We do not know which business models are likely to succeed in the marketplace for 
residential real estate services in the future. We do believe, however, that judicious public policy 
interventions could have a marked impact on improving services and lowering costs for home 
buyers and sellers. BRINGING MORE
COMPETITION TO REAL
ESTATE BROKERAGE
ROBERT W. HAHN,R OBERT E. LITAN, AND JESSE
GURMAN*
Abstract
This paper provides an economic analysis of the residential real
estate brokerage industry. We  nd that the traditional model for res-
idential real estate brokerage services may be dated, and could be
improved substantially with some public policy interventions that
spur innovation.
We believe that there are numerous barriers to entry that are slow-
ing the emergence of new models for serving consumers. Some of
these barriers are likely to be anti-competitive. Examples include
discrimination against new brokerage models and online brokers
who wish to join multiple listing services; state legislation that
would require minimum service requirements, e ectively prevent-
ing ‘‘a la carte’’ o erings; and prohibitions by real estate commis-
sions on providing rebates to customers. In our opinion, none of
these practices should be allowed.
We o er three broad policy recommendations: First, antitrust
authorities should carefully scrutinize e orts to limit competition in
*Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan are the co-founders and directors of
the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Jesse Gurman is a
research assistant at the AEI-Brookings Joint Center. The authors would like
to thank Scott Wallsten, John Weicher, Susan Woodward and Norm Miller for
helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Ameri-
can Antitrust Institute’s Symposium on Competition in the Residential Real
Estate Brokerage Industry in November 2005 and at the Federal Trade Com-
mission and Department of Justice’s Competition Policy and the Real Estate
Industry Workshop in October 2005. In addition, a shorter version of the paper
appeared in the Milken Institute Review in December 2005. The views
expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the institu-
tions with which they are a liated.
86the residential real estate brokerage market. Second, state govern-
ments should refrain from adopting laws or rules that inhibit com-
petition in real estate brokerage. Third, Congress should allow the
Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department to permit
banks, which have long been natural potential entrants into this busi-
ness, to o er residential real estate brokerage services through
separately capitalized a liates.
We do not know which business models are likely to succeed in
the marketplace for residential real estate services in the future. We
do believe, however, that judicious public policy interventions could
have a marked impact on improving services and lowering costs for
home buyers and sellers.
1. Introduction
For most Americans, the largest single purchase they will make
is a house.
1 Most of them will do it by engaging the services of a
licensed real estate professional.
2 For brokers, selling houses is a big
business. In 2004, the estimated revenue of the brokerage industry
was $60 billion.
3
Over the last year, the residential real estate brokerage industry
has been featured in the news. A number of publications have
reported the rise of newer discount brokerage services, operating on
and o  the Internet, that have begun to o er buyers and sellers
cheaper alternatives to the commissions of between 5 and 6 percent
that have traditionally been charged by real estate brokers.
4 In
March, 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)  led an antitrust
suit against the Kentucky Real Estate Commission for prohibiting
agents from giving consumers a rebate on some of the commissions
1See HUD (2005).
2According to NAR (2004a), 77% of homebuyers used a real estate agent or
broker in their purchase.
3Data from Real Trends yields an estimate of $61 billion in $2004. This
 gure is commonly cited in popular press. See, for example, Wilke and Hag-
erty (2005). The Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that brokers’ com-
missions on residential sales totaled $96.6 billion in 2004, but this calculation
assumes commission rates are  xed at speci ed levels, an issue we address
below. See BEA (2005). Unless otherwise noted, all dollar  gures are in 2004
dollars.
4See Mullaney (2005) and Risen (2005).
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5 Legislatures in other states have recently introduced or
enacted bills to prohibit real estate agents from o ering more limited
service, which they can perform at a lower fee. Several states tabled
the bills only upon direct warning from the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission that such laws were anti-
competitive.
6
In perhaps the most important action of all, in September, 2005
the DOJ  led an antitrust suit against the industry’s national trade
association, the National Association of Realtors (NAR), over their
website rules. The lawsuit came after a 20-month investigation of
the trade association’s rules, issued in response to the advent of on-
line brokerage.
7 These rules would allow NAR member agents and
brokers, if they so choose, to withhold their listings from being
displayed on other brokers’ websites, including the websites of on-
line brokers.
8 Representatives of the NAR have denied that their
rules thwart competition and instead argue that brokers are entitled
to control how their customers’ listings are distributed and
displayed.
9
So what should consumers really think? Do the new brokerage
models promise real cost savings for buyers and sellers? Is the
traditional industry and its trade association truly making it more
di cult for new entrants to compete, to the detriment of home buy-
5Eleven states currently ban rebates, in addition to others that restrict the
form they can take. See Birger (2005). See Department of Justice (2005a) for
information on the Kentucky lawsuit.
6Illinois and Missouri passed such laws before any DOJ intervention. Sev-
eral other states have passed or are considering similar bills in spite of direct
discouragement from DOJ and Federal Trade Commission to the Oklahoma
and Texas legislatures. See Roberts (2005b) for a summary of legislative
activity. See Department of Justice (2005b) and Department of Justice (2005c)
for the responses to Oklahoma and Texas.
7See Wilke and Hagerty (2005) for a summary of DOJ’s action. NAR at-
tempted unsuccessfully to negotiate with the Department and revise their rules
in order to avoid a suit.
8NAR’s policies only technically a ect ‘‘Realtors’’ and not all real estate
agents. The term Realtor is a registered trademark of the National Association
of Realtors and refers only to real estate agents who belong to NAR and thus
have agreed to abide by their ethics policies and other guidelines. Since a
substantial proportion of active agents are Realtors (see NAR (2004b)), it is
fair to argue that their policies have a signi cant impact on how business is
conducted. Any licensing requirements or other regulations passed by state
legislatures or commissions apply to all licensed agents and brokers, regard-
less of NAR membership.
9See Hagerty (2005).
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can or should be done to promote competition in this industry?
These are among the questions we address in this paper.
In brief, we reach several conclusions:
D It is di cult to tell whether the industry is acting anti-
competitively by simply examining commission rates. From
1991 to 2004, average commission rates have declined nation-
ally from about 6.1% to 5.1%.
10 According to these numbers,
claims that commission rates are  xed do not appear to have
empirical support. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the distinct
possibility that the structure of the industry, as well as certain
practices of some of its members, has led to rates that are above
what they would have been in a more competitive environment.
Furthermore, U.S. rates appear to be above those of other
advanced countries. Average commission rates in other devel-
oped countries appear to range from 1 to 10% with a mean of
3.5%. Thus, U.S. commission rates are about 1.5 to 2.5 per-
centage points above the average.
11 While foreign commission
rates may not be appropriate for the U.S. because of di erences
in the housing brokerage markets and services rendered, at the
very least they argue for more scrutiny and study of the U.S.
industry.
D The Internet has the potential to signi cantly reduce the costs
of buying or selling a house as well as increase the value of
real estate services. First, it can dramatically reduce search
costs for buyers and sellers, and also improve the matching of
buyers and sellers. In a competitive market, cost savings to
brokers should be re ected in lower commission rates, but this
does not appear to be happening yet on a wide scale. Second,
the Internet should facilitate the disaggregation of real estate
services, such as listing and searching for houses, negotiating a
contract, and getting title insurance. This disaggregation should
improve e ciency by allowing consumers to choose only those
services they need and pay accordingly. For example, sellers
can use the multiple listing service in many areas to show their
10These commission estimates are based on Real Trends data. See, for
example, Risen (2005).
11Average calculated by us from 18 developed countries (out of 30 total)
from Delcoure and Miller (2002). 10% is atypical and usually applies to lower-
priced houses. According to the study, most rates in developed countries are
2% to 4%, typically split between buyer and seller.
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12 Recent developments
indicate more Internet-based entry into the listing business,
from both existing and new competitors. If this entry is not in-
hibited, it could encourage more competition in real estate
brokerage, and in turn, lower fees.
D There are numerous barriers to entry that are slowing the emer-
gence of new models for serving consumers. Some of these
barriers are likely to be anti-competitive. Examples include
discrimination against new brokerage models and online
brokers who wish to join multiple listing services; state legisla-
tion that would require minimum service requirements, ef-
fectively preventing ‘‘a la carte’’ o erings; and prohibitions by
real estate commissions on providing rebates to customers. In
our opinion, state governments and regulators should reject
policies that restrict competition in the real estate market.
Furthermore, while private entities such as real estate associa-
tions are free to pursue their own economic interests, it is
perfectly appropriate for both federal and state authorities to
scrutinize their practices and act to ensure that they do not
violate antitrust laws.
D Finally, federal  nancial policy makers can and should enhance
competition in real estate brokerage by authorizing banks to
engage in this activity through separately capitalized a liates.
The Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department have
the authority under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to give this
permission.
13 Resistance to the participation of banks in real
estate brokerage is yet another instance of traditional brokers
being protected by a barrier to legitimate competition. Congress
should allow this competition to proceed because it is likely to
bene t consumers. One possible bene cial e ect of recent
federal antitrust investigations is that it may encourage elected
o cials to promote more competition in real estate brokerage
12Numerous websites such as  atfeelisting.com and forsalebyowner.com
connect sellers with a local agent who will list their home in the MLS for a  at
fee, typically around $500-$700. Many bricks-and-mortar agents are o ering
limited service such as  at fee MLS listing as well. For other examples, see
Hagerty and Simon (2005) and NAR (2005d).
13For summary and text of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, see U.S. Senate
(1999).
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complish this important objective.
14
2. The Traditional Real Estate Brokerage Model
For decades, buying and selling a home in the United States has
been a routine process. Residential real estate agents have tradition-
ally provided a bundle of services to both buyers and sellers. For
example, the local multiple listing service (MLS), which is a direc-
tory of listings typically maintained and paid for by local real estate
 rms, enables sellers to list their properties and buyers and agents to
view these properties. Agents also often help with marketing a house
through advertising and open houses, negotiating a price, and ad-
dressing contracting and closing issues. Examples include helping
with inspections, mortgage insurance, and  nancing, to mention a
few.
Home sellers are typically required to enter into an exclusive
agreement with the agent trying to sell their home, known as the
‘‘listing agent.’’ This agent represents the seller in dealing with all
potential buyers and is typically paid a predetermined fee, in the
neighborhood of 6% of the sale price, which is frequently split
among agents and brokers who facilitate the deal. To help reach
interested buyers, listing agents usually o er part of this fee to any
other agent who brings in a buyer upon completion of the sale. If the
listing agent is able to  nd a buyer without the help of another agent,
he can act as a ‘‘dual agent’’ and keep the whole fee. Under this
system, home buyers do not have to contract with the agent helping
them, or pay them directly for their services. However, the home
buyer does share some of the cost of her agent’s services, since the
seller prices his house to account for the fee.
15
Upon completion of the deal, the seller’s agent and the buyer’s
agent (if there is one) often split the commission with their brokers.
A broker typically helps and supervises agents, and requires an ad-
ditional license.
16 The split between broker and agent may be 50-50
for newer agents, though agents often get to keep a higher percent-
age once they become more skilled and experienced. Under some
14See the discussion below on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and banks as
potential competitors.
15See Frew and Jud (1987).
16This is a common arrangement. The exact rights and roles of agents and
brokers vary on a state-by-state basis. See www.arello.org for more
information.
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o ce space, phones and copying, and let the agent keep the whole
commission.
17
A brokerage, which can include one or more brokers, agents and
support sta , can either operate independently or belong to a local,
regional or national real estate network. Brokerages that choose to
franchise can bene t from the advertising and name recognition of
these networks. A local franchisee pays fees to the franchisor for the
brand name, o ce space and other support by splitting revenues in
some proportion or paying a  xed amount per month, quarter or
year and keeping the commissions themselves.
This traditional structure is notable for two reasons. First, we
believe that the involvement of multiple parties and the unique split-
ting arrangements make it di cult for buyers and sellers to pay for
services according to their needs. Second, the commonality of the
structure across  rms and its persistence over time suggest the pos-
sibility that alternative models have not had a fair chance to
compete. Both of these issues are examined further below.
3. Is the Real Estate Brokerage Market E cient?
Academics Aren’t Sure
There is substantial literature on whether the residential real estate
market for brokerage services is e cient. By e cient, we mean
maximizing the bene ts to consumers as well as pro ts to brokers.
The literature on this subject is inconclusive, in part because there is
an absence of available data on how these markets actually operate.
A number of academics have examined the relationship among vari-
ous factors, including commission structure, housing prices and the
quality of service.
18
Many scholars and casual observers suggest that commission
rates have been relatively stable, around 6%, over the years, sug-
gesting there is not much price competition among agents. Given
the relatively free entry into agent market, some conclude that a
form of price  xing, or at least informal collusion, keeps fees at an
17According to NAR (2003a), in 2002, 73% of Realtors split some part of
their commission with their broker, 20% kept their entire commissions, and
the rest had another compensation arrangement. RE/MAX is well known for
its ‘‘100% plan’’ which allows agents to keep their entire commissions.
18See Benjamin, Jud and Sirmans (2000) for a comprehensive review of res-
idential real estate research.
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consumers.
19
One study developed a theoretical model and calculated the
socially optimal commission rate to be 3%.
20 Another argued that
commission rigidity results in a socially wasteful oversupply of un-
derproductive agents in high-priced cities, compared to lower-priced
ones.
21 An empirical study of commission rates across 30 countries
using data from 1999 found that fees in the United States are
signi cantly higher for comparable real estate services o ered in
other industrialized nations.
22
Other academics have maintained that the market does exhibit
competitive characteristics, and that a theory of widespread collu-
sion is unconvincing. Some studies suggest that paying an agent
something above his minimum acceptable commission rate could
yield bene ts for the seller because of the additional e ort the agent
might spend on selling the house.
23 Other studies argue competitive
rates are unlikely to be achieved due to some of the  xed costs
involved in providing real estate services.
24 Furthermore, one could
19Whether the losses to consumers are merely transfers to producers is an-
other matter. It depends on how the agents and brokers respond. For example,
Turnbull (1996) suggests that agents may expend more e ort on behalf of
clients if rates are higher, thus providing some additional bene ts to
consumers.
20See Anglin and Arnott (1999).
21A seemingly competitive environment in which more agents are compet-
ing for the same number of listings still may be ine cient if they are not
competing on price. See Hsieh and Moretti (2002). This phenomenon of agent
oversupply has been documented in articles such as Streitfeld (2005).
22See Delcoure and Miller (2002).
23Bruce and Santore (2004) suggest that the equilibrium commission rate
may be higher than the least expensive agents are willing to work for, since an
increase in the fee is a way to motivate the agent to get a better price when ef-
fort is unobservable. Other studies have highlighted this di culty in aligning
the goals of house sellers and their brokers, since brokers are likely to pro t
more from selling a higher volume of houses in a given time period than by
waiting to get the highest possible price on each one. Levitt and Syverson
(2005) document this phenomenon by showing that agents leave their own
homes on the market longer, and get a higher price on average, than they do
for their clients. See also Miceli (1991) and Yavas (1996) for a discussion of
possible con icts of interest among sellers, buyers and their brokers.
24See Yavas (2001).
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together could give rise to prices that deviate from costs.
25
Many of the arguments on both sides are based, to varying
degrees, on the assumption that fees are stable. But some literature
suggests otherwise. Using a large sample of housing data for a single
area, one study suggests that commission rates are sensitive to local
market factors, including house prices.
26 This  nding is consistent
with other studies that have found a connection between higher
housing prices and lower commission rates.
27
Furthermore, there is some limited evidence that commission
rates have generally fallen over time. As mentioned above, the aver-
age national commission rate charged on a house transaction is
estimated to have fallen from 6.1% in 1991 to 5.1% in 2004—about
17%. During that period, housing price increases have outpaced in-
 ation by 55%, particularly in the last  ve years.
28 Commission
revenues from the sale of an average priced house have thus risen,
but at a rate that is only slightly higher than in ation.
29 But these are
national estimates. It is possible that in areas of the country where
home prices have been rising most rapidly, such as on both coasts,
commission revenues have considerably outpaced in ation. We can-
not know de nitively without having more detailed commission
data by state and locality. Clearly, there is a need for more data to
be collected, especially by an impartial source.
30
While there is not much evidence to support the view that agents
have competed vigorously on commission rates for the average
25See Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Evans (2003).
26For example, Sirmans and Turnbull (1997) analyzed data from a local
MLS in Baton Rouge over an eight year period, which included a boom and
bust in the housing cycle.
27Goolsby and Child (1988) showed this using somewhat more limited data.
See Benjamin, Jud and Sirmans (2000) for more examples.
28This price increase was calculated using the O ce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight’s Housing Price Index. See OFHEO (2005). According
to this data, the increase from 1991-2004 was 94%.
29Using the HPI prices, the increase in revenue per house was 51% from
1991-2004 (commission and agents per sale data from Real Trends), slightly
higher than the 39% in ation from the Consumer Price Index (See
www.bls.gov). Using Real Trends’ price data, the revenue increase was 31%,
slightly lower than in ation.
30For an analysis of industry data, see Weicher (2005).
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31 Still, if commission rates
are arti cially high due to barriers to entry in the industry, then more
vigorous competition could lead to more dramatic bene ts for
consumers. The commission on the exchange of a house frequently
represents a signi cant portion of the transaction cost. If this trans-
action cost could be reduced, then it is highly likely that buyers and
sellers of homes would be better o .
32 Under the current system, it is
very di cult for a buyer to reduce the cost of the transaction by
searching for a home and representing himself.
33
One of the ways that has been suggested for increasing competi-
tion has been to change rules governing access to the MLS. One
review of the literature suggests that full access should be provided
to all buyers and sellers in order to promote economic e ciency.
34
4. Making Sense of the Academic Mishmash
While the academics  ght amongst themselves about whether
this industry is reasonably e cient, we think that there are reasons
to be skeptical. In particular, the rules governing access to the
multiple listing services have not received the attention they deserve
in the academic literature.
35
The MLS is a very powerful and useful tool for bringing together
buyers and sellers. One reason the MLS in most locales has become
a staple of the residential real estate industry is that the MLS deliv-
ers substantial e ciency gains to all who use it. Collecting all of the
listings for a given region in one place signi cantly reduces the
31Some reports have indicated recent pressure on commission rates,
particularly in areas where prices are increasing rapidly. See, for example
Bahney (2005).
32The only caveat could be that a reduction in the commission rate could
reduce the e ort of agents representing the buyer or the seller. We think the
market could handle such changes with suitable adjustments in contracting
terms.
33Exclusive agreements between a seller and his agent often include a preset
 xed fee that impedes a buyer’s ability to negotiate the half of the commission
he is e ectively paying (in the form of a higher house price) if he does not
need certain agent services.
34See Yavas (1994). This particular review does not specify the terms on
which access should be provided.
35Yavas (1994) provides a good summary of studies assessing the impact of
the MLS system on the brokerage market. He and others (for example, Crock-
ett (1982)) have pointed to the MLS as a major source of ine ciency and
argued for wider access to listings, and ultimately unbundling of services.
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spend gathering information that is crucial to potential transactions.
But the cooperative networking relationship among agents in a
regional MLS has the potential to give rise to uniformity in services
provided and fees charged. In fact, up through 1950, at least some
MLSs explicitly set fees that their members could charge, until such
actions were deemed in violation of federal antitrust law.
36 Since
then, it has been illegal to set standardized rates among members,
but there are other, more tacit ways of reinforcing such cooperation.
One possible means of tacit collusion is through the multiple list-
ing service admission process. Terms of MLS membership are gen-
erally decided by the MLS board, which usually overlaps with the
dominant local brokers and the state or local Realtor associations.
Since MLSs are private entities, they set their own admission
criteria, but for most MLSs, the terms are coordinated though
NAR’s national policy, and they can design it to keep membership
limited to  rms who will conduct their business in a particular
manner.
37
Another potential avenue for collusion is through boycotts, either
as a group or by the dominant player. An MLS listing typically
shows which agent is representing a home seller. Other agents can
avoid bringing buyers to houses listed by agents who o er lower
commissions or operate under an alternative business model.
38
Skeptics may argue that incentives to compete on price are high,
and that relatively free entry should inevitably result in such
competition. But there are relatively few large brokerages in many
areas, and they may be able to keep rates arti cially high. Even
some large cities have only a few successful brokerage companies,
and since brokers are allowed to control fee policies among their
agents, sustaining collusive behavior is easier than if each agent sets
his own fee. Also, in many cases, membership in the MLS is
predicated on membership in the National Association of Realtors,
which requires membership in the local and state association of
36See U.S. v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485
(1950).
37There are around 800 MLSs (see Risen (2005)) throughout the country,
some NAR-a liated, some not. Their structure and operating procedures vary
somewhat. We  nd that the commonalities among MLSs are generally more
meaningful than the di erences, but realize that our analysis may not apply to
some MLSs that di er from the norm.
38See Birger and Caplin (2004) for examples of discrimination and boycott-
ing of discounters.
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spirit and similarities in service o erings.
Some brokers view the listings as their property, as opposed to
the seller’s, and believe they should have some control over who
gets to utilize them. They also may believe they have a duty to
protect their customers from unscrupulous agents who may bring
down the quality of the system.
While these concerns are legitimate, they must be viewed in light
of the informational bottleneck the MLS system creates, and
therefore must be balanced against any anti-competitive ine cien-
cies the MLS facilitates.
39 Our own views on how to strike an ap-
propriate balance will be discussed shortly. But we  rst turn to what
is rapidly becoming a critical factor in the evolution of this
industry—the Internet.
5. The Role of Internet-Based Services
The Internet has revolutionized the way business is done in many
sectors of the economy, and surely will continue to produce more
change in the years ahead. The Net has had an especially signi cant
impact on all activities that involve searching by consumers for the
best deal. By dramatically lowering search costs—giving consum-
ers access to a vast array of suppliers without having to physically
go to them—the Net has led to new business models (think ‘‘bricks
and clicks,’’ or having both a Net and physical presence in retail, as
one example). The Net has also led to lower costs and prices in a
range of services, including such traditional ‘‘brokerage’’ activities
as selling securities and travel services.
A few recent studies have revealed some of the economic bene ts
available to real estate service providers and consumers who utilize
the Internet. Two empirical studies have used survey data to demon-
strate gains to brokers, and found that  rms who utilize computer
technology and the Internet tend to have superior productivity and
pro t margins.
40 Another study compared home buyers who used
the Internet for searching with buyers who did not and found that
those using the Internet located more houses meeting their needs in
39We do not dispute that brokers have some legal ownership over sellers’
listings. However, this does not allow them to pursue strategies that restrict le-
gitimate competition or that violate  duciary obligations to their customers.
See discussion below.
40See Benjamin, Chinloy, Jud and Winkler (2004) and Jud, Donald, Sir-
mans and Winkler (2002).
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41 Others have speculated that resi-
dential real estate transaction costs could be reduced by as much as
50% if technology were better utilized.
42
The Internet could, and probably should, have a radical impact on
real estate brokerage services, where searching is much of what real
estate agents have traditionally done. Displaying listings online is
an obvious step for the industry, to facilitate quick and e ective
matching between potential buyers and sellers. Identifying both the
inevitability and usefulness of this technological step, the NAR
began a national MLS, Realtor.com, consisting of listings from lo-
cal MLSs throughout the country. Most major brokers and national
franchisors now maintain their own websites (often including MLS
listings) in order to advertise their services to increasingly web-
savvy customers. According to one survey, about 70% of home buy-
ers do use the Internet when searching for a home.
43
In addition to these technological cost savings and marketing ad-
vantages that have been similarly recognized in other industries,
more widespread use of the Internet is challenging the conventional
process for selling a home. Some newer startups have emerged to
try to harness technological innovation to better meet consumers’
real estate needs. National  rms such as eRealty and ZipRealty oper-
ate largely on the Web and pass on some of their savings from low
overhead and high productivity to their customers.
44
Other recent entrants have attempted to disaggregate the process
of buying or selling a home, specializing in particular parts of the
process and trying to perform them more e ciently. LendingTree,
which is also web-based, assesses buyers’ and sellers’ needs and
41See Anderson, Johnson and Zumpano (2003). The California Association
of Realtors has also conducted studies showing that buyers using the Internet
spend more time searching on their own before contacting a Realtor and less
time working with the Realtor, including fewer accompanied house visits. See
Evans (2004). In cases where consumers are undertaking more work them-
selves, the resulting cost savings to agents should be re ected in the form of
lower fees.
42See Ham and Atkinson (2003). The complete empirical basis for this
estimate is not provided, but the authors do o er several suggestions for ways
in which technology could improve the e ciency of real estate services.
43See NAR (2004a).
44These companies used to openly advertise their fees at 4.5%, but now
negotiate on a case-by-case basis. They still maintain that their model a ords
their customers savings compared to traditional brokers. See Hagerty (2003).
eRealty is now owned by Prudential Realty. See www.erealty.com and
www.ziprealty.com.
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contracted agents can help with the transaction. The network agents
split a portion of their commissions from completed sales with
LendingTree for helping recruit the customer, and LendingTree in
turn passes a rebate on to the consumer as a discounting incentive to
use their services. HomeGain operates on a similar web-based,
networking model.
45
Other Internet-based services, such as Flatfeelisting.com and
Forsalebyowner.com, o er to place home sellers’ listing informa-
tion in local MLS databases for a  at fee, often from $500-$700.
This presents potentially large savings for sellers willing to do some
of the work themselves, such as showing the property to potential
buyers and negotiating the sales price. The seller would still likely
have to o er half of a commission, typically 3% of the sales
price—in order to attract buying agents to bring their customers—
but this still represents a 50% savings.
46 Recently, startups such as
Zillow.com and Red n.com have begun to o er individual real
estate services, such as estimating home value and automated bid-
ding, without the assistance of an agent.
47
Some ‘‘bricks-and-mortar’’ brokers are experimenting with
alternative models as well. Foxtons, originally an English company,
gained some traction in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut by
o ering stripped-down services at a two percent fee. It now provides
full-service brokerage for three percent, saving costs and boosting
productivity by breaking the transaction up among its specialized
sta .
48 Other ‘‘fee-for-service’’ or ‘‘menu pricing’’  rms have
emerged that charge  at or hourly fees for speci c services, such as
listing in the MLS or closing contracts, and thus allow customers
45See www.homegain.com.
46Exactly how much of this 50% savings is kept by either side depends on
how much each party values the services of the agent bringing the buyer. The
seller typically pays the fee but can raise the house price to shift some or all of
the commission to the buyer. We welcome the emergence of di erent forms of
contractual arrangements, such as buyers paying their own agents directly,
which may better capture the value the buyer and seller place on the services
each receives. One encouraging development in this area is the emergence of
‘‘buyer’s brokers,’’ who can be hired separately by the buyer and are dedicated
to serving his interests, as distinct from the seller’s. See, for example, Tolle
(2005).
47See Darlin (2006).
48Foxtons has teams of marketers, agents and attorneys who handle di er-
ent stages of a home sale. See www.foxtons.com. The company used to forgo
listing its houses in the MLS and hosting open houses (see Sloane (2003)) but
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as Help-U-Sell, for example, are helping to popularize  at-fee
alternatives at a national level.
49 Even traditional companies such as
Coldwell Banker and Century 21 have experimented with discount
and menu price services.
50 This suggests that demand for these op-
tions is becoming mainstream, and that new entrants present a com-
petitive threat to older models and fees.
Splitting up real estate services into smaller parts could result in
substantial gains for consumers. We may be moving toward a new
era in which  rms develop a variety of di erent business models.
Some will specialize in speci c parts of the process, allowing
consumers to choose exactly what  ts their needs; and some may
o er bundles of services that match or exceed those of traditional
agents.
While the Internet could have a large positive impact for home
buyers and sellers, there is no guarantee that this change will occur
rapidly. As discussed earlier, access to the MLS appears to be a
potential bottleneck. This access is tightly controlled by board
members selected by existing members, and often requires local Re-
altor association membership.
51 This control is likely to have
bene ted traditional incumbent brokers, but does not necessarily
bene t consumers or reward innovative producers. If home buyers,
and  rms with new business models, were able to access the MLS
listings more easily and could take a proactive role in the search
process, the dynamics of the industry likely would change. As noted
above, this is already beginning to occur, with both Internet
companies and some bricks-and-mortar companies o ering more
specialized services on attractive terms.
It may be the case that a signi cant number of consumers prefer
the traditional system, where they pay a single agent a percentage of
now includes these and other traditional services as part of the standard 3%
plan.
49See www.helpusell.com. Other examples of popular fee-for-service
companies include Assist-U-Sell and National Association of Real Estate
Consultants. See Hagerty (2004).
50Blue Edge Realty is a discount o shoot of Coldwell Banker, available in
Illinois and Pennsylvania. See www.blueedge.com. Century 21 o ers  at fee
services, including MLS listings, in select states. See www.c21clickit.com.
51For a typical example of MLS bylaws, see Regional Multiple Listing Ser-
vice Inc. (2003). MLS bylaws are often very similar to each other, particularly
when the service is NAR-a liated, since they are based on national guidelines
and must be approved by NAR.
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that paying a commission is an important e ort motivator that leads
to better results than  at fee payments. But the best way to learn
what consumers really want is to allow them to choose from the rich
array of services the market is capable of delivering.
In the end, no one knows exactly what the real estate market of
the future will look like. But the experience of other industries, such
as the deregulation of rates in the buying and selling of stocks, sug-
gests that the impact could be substantial.
52 The key, in our view, is
to create an environment that encourages rather than suppresses
competition. As we suggest in the next section, there are reasons to
believe that special interests may succeed in sti ing competition
that could lead to dramatic innovations that would bene t
consumers.
6. Resistance to Innovative Competition by
Traditional Realtors
The National Association of Realtors and state and local real
estate boards have a direct economic stake in keeping out potential
competitors to the bricks-and-mortar model. They do so using a va-
riety of mechanisms, many of which are likely to hurt consumers.
Though some traditional brokers have embraced the marketing
capabilities and cost savings a orded by the Internet, there has been
active resistance in the industry toward the use of innovative busi-
ness models that threaten to make the standard one obsolete. Some
of the bigger, established companies may fear that the importance
of branding and franchising, on which they rely heavily for pro ts,
will be signi cantly diminished if independent brokers can recruit
customers through web-based or network models more cost-
e ectively.
One of NAR’s stated objectives is to ‘‘advocate for expanding
the REALTORL role in managing the entire transaction.’’ Another
is to ‘‘support development of real estate-related business models
52See, for example, Jarrell (1984). Today, buying and selling of an unlimited
number of shares costs less than $10. In the seventies, it could cost on the or-
der of $1 per share to buy or sell. The drop has been remarkable and is due to
deregulation and the resulting increase in competition, and changes in technol-
ogy—most notably the Internet. See also, Winston (1993) and Hahn and Hird
(1991). See White (2005) for a discussion of the parallels between the securi-
ties industry and real estate brokerage.
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53
While it is expected that a trade group will do everything it can to
protect the success of its members, we believe some of the actions
taken by NAR and state realty organizations are likely to violate
antitrust law and their own ethics codes. Furthermore, these actions
are likely to hurt consumers and overall economic welfare. We focus
on the following  ve barriers to competition being erected by real
estate associations, and by some legislators and regulators who are
in uenced by them: 1) NAR’s rules for online listings; 2) discrimi-
nation in MLS membership; 3) state minimum service licensing
requirements; 4) state anti-rebate laws; and 5) Congressional limits
on banks participating in real estate brokerage.
1) NAR has been adjusting its rules for displaying MLS listings
on the Internet since 2000, when an MLS in Texas  led a copyright
infringement suit against eRealty for showing listings to customers
through its website. eRealty claimed that, as a member of the MLS
it had just as much a right to distribute listings to potential custom-
ers through its ‘‘virtual o ce website’’ as any other member did in
its physical o ce. It  led a counterclaim alleging other MLS
members were sti ing competition by trying to restrict MLS access.
To settle what threatened to become a widespread problem in local
MLSs, NAR drafted a voluntary sharing policy, which allows for
the creation of MLS-sponsored websites that would display listings
of member brokers in a given local MLS who chose to participate.
54
eRealty was dissatis ed with NAR’s solution and continued to
pursue its right to share all MLS listings with customers via the
web. It claimed that it shared the listings in a controlled environ-
ment, requiring a login and acceptance of terms from customers and
thus allowing for a similar broker-customer relationship as a physi-
cal o ce.
55 In 2003, the Department of Justice launched an investi-
gation of the matter to determine whether NAR was trying to re-
strict the ability of Internet competitors like eRealty to compete.
56
53See NAR (2005a).
54This came to be known as NAR’s ‘‘Internet Display Policy.’’ An MLS-
sponsored listings site, where members can post listings and also advertise
their broker services, is known as an ‘‘Internet Data Exchange.’’ For a full de-
scription of the eRealty case, see Capper (2002).
55In particular, it did not freely distribute listings, which was a concern
raised by traditional MLS members.
56NAR has, over the last two years, been re-drafting its policy for virtual of-
 ce websites, which was set to take e ect in July 2005. The rollout of this new
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received the most attention is known as ‘‘selective opt-out.’’ The
policy says that MLS members are free to distribute listings to
customers over the Internet, but that any member who does not want
its listings shared can choose the  rms it wants to exclude from
sharing its listings on the Internet, without any requirement to notify
the home seller.
57
The problem with selective opt-out is that it makes it even easier
to tacitly collude against entrants with new business models.
58
Indeed, NAR has admitted that including selective opt-out was a
concession to the two largest national companies in the industry.
59
Without an equal ability to utilize the MLS, legitimate competitors
with new business models may not be able to compete against
established companies.
In our view, there is little justi cation in being able to discrimi-
nate selectively in sharing Internet listings. Brokers cannot prevent
each other from showing the pooled listings to potential customers
who walk in their o ces.
60 Making such a distinction for the Inter-
net is not only arbitrary but discourages innovative models that may
improve the e ciency of service delivery.
The NAR has signaled a willingness to abandon the selective opt-
put provision of their virtual o ce website rules, in favor of a new
provision known as ‘‘blanket’’ or ‘‘general’’ opt-out. General opt-
out would allow an MLS member an all-or-nothing choice to let
other members display its listings online. This option leaves less
policy has been delayed further, until January 2006, due to continued
investigation by DOJ. See Wilke and Hagerty (2005) and NAR (2005b).
57See NAR (2003b). It is possible that some form of disclosure will
ultimately be required in the  nal rules.
58It is easy to see how  rms with large market shares could cooperate,
explicitly or implicitly, by withholding display rights from any competing
 rms whose model or pricing structure threatened their pro ts. While  rms
have a right to pursue pro ts, the Sherman Act of 1890 prohibits them from
coordinating business strategy or unfairly restricting entry to the market by le-
gitimate competitors.
59In Risen, (2005), NAR spokesman Steve Cook explains, ‘‘ ‘Cendant and
RE/MAX said they would not cooperate without broker opt-out. In a sense,
we had the concern that the whole MLS was at risk, that they would create
their own database.’ ’’ According to the article, these are the two largest
national franchises, accounting for roughly 40% of the market. Cendant is the
parent company of Coldwell Banker, Century 21 and ERA.
60To the contrary, they have supported doing so for many years as an e ec-
tive way to match buyers and sellers.
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61 Nonetheless, apparently after
some attempts by the NAR to persuade the Justice Department that
a general opt-out did not violate the antitrust laws, DOJ proceeded
to  le suit against the NAR in September, 2005, alleging that the
new rules still impeded competition in real estate brokerage. The
NAR presumably will defend against the suit largely on the grounds
that brokers own their listings and are not required to share them
with anyone, even if such sharing leads to wider exposure of the
listings to potential buyers.
There is no question that  rms should have some rights over list-
ings they acquire in order to give them appropriate incentives to get
those listings. The question is where to draw the line in terms of
limiting a  rm’s ability to fend o  unwanted competition that may
be socially desirable.
62 DOJ is implicitly drawing the line where
competitors can agree among themselves on actions that limit the
sharing of those listings. If this case ever goes to trial, a court could
provide de nitive guidance as to who is right: the DOJ or the NAR.
As of this writing, we believe that the Justice Department’s position
is not unreasonable. If the rules are not struck down on their face,
we hope that relevant authorities will ensure that they are not used
anti-competitively in individual markets.
There are also ethical and  duciary concerns under state law that
should be prominent in a broker’s decision to permit other brokers
to show the listings to potential buyers. Selling brokers have a duty
to promote the home seller’s interests, which in most cases surely
means giving the seller’s listing maximum exposure, to get the high-
est price possible or the quickest sale.
63 Even if  rms are not
explicitly trying to limit competition, banning some competitors
from displaying listings to potential buyers may be inconsistent
with such goals. Brokers should be obligated to serve their custom-
61It does uphold the distinction between paper and online listings, treating
those who choose to operate primarily online di erently from those who do
not.
62Blanket opt-out may still allow brokerages to act anti-competitively-for
example, if one or two dominant  rms in a region choose to opt-out for the
express purpose of sti ing competitors. We acknowledge that without proof of
coordination between  rms or intentional abuse of monopoly power, practices
are not actionable under antitrust law, but we would at least encourage
consideration of the competitive impact of all opt-out provisions by the ap-
propriate authorities, such as the Department of Justice.
63See NAR (2005c) for NAR’s Code of Ethics. See Tolle (2005) for a basic
description of  duciary duty as it pertains to real estate. Speci c laws vary by
state.
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ing the pool of available buyers for a particular house.
64
2) MLS rules at the local level are also impeding competition.
For example, many local MLSs will not allow listings by ‘‘network
brokers’’—those that refer potential home sellers and other agents
for a fee, as described above. The ostensible rationale is that the on-
line referral sites are not su ciently ‘‘engaged in real estate.’’
65 We
believe this rationale is a device for inhibiting legitimate
competition.
66 Online companies that perform marketing services
and refer customers to agents who bid for the customer’s business
are simply o ering real estate brokerage through a di erent busi-
ness model. These requirements do not appear to be legitimate bases
for denying access to the MLS, and the justi cations that the rules
protect consumers are unproven and even somewhat ironic.
67
3) Another way in which competition may be impeded is through
state legislation, often crafted by state real estate commissions who
oversee real estate licensing policies. These commissions are sup-
posed to protect consumer interests, but their members are often
themselves practicing brokers, nominated and supported by promi-
64There may be some cases where a customer, for privacy or other reasons,
wishes not to have his listing freely displayed on the Internet by other broker-
ages, but absent such a concern we  nd it di cult to see why it would not be
in a seller’s interest to distribute as widely as possible. In the traditional MLS,
in which the only opt-out mechanism is not to join, the listing is freely
displayed on paper.
65See section 17.2 of Regional Multiple Listing Service (2003) bylaws for
an example of this common, vague ‘‘engaged in real estate’’ requirement. We
do not see how a so-called ‘‘referral’’ company who obtains a state broker
license and matches its contracted agents to buyers and sellers is not ‘‘engaged
in real estate.’’ Requirements that those who have access to the listings must
be the ones to exchange compensation (see section 1.5(a)) serve only to keep
the process bundled together. These results clearly bene t traditional brokers,
but have no obvious bene ts for consumers or welfare. The NAR online rules
sustain discrimination against network models by prohibiting  rms from
receiving compensation for referring customers to other brokers. See provi-
sion ‘‘4g’’ of NAR (2003b). As discussed, the national policy is still being
revised, but we feel that provisions that impede alternative models are likely
to be unjusti ed economically.
66Some MLSs allow network brokers to partner with other member brokers,
but this still relegates them to second-class status and reduces the bene ts to
consumers that would likely result if they were able to operate independently.
67Cases such as U.S. vs. Realty Multi-List (5th Cir. 1980) have found that
MLS admission requirements that may negatively a ect competition must be
balanced by a legitimate pro-competitive purpose and must be well tailored to
meet that purpose.
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regulatory restriction that has been pushed by some state commis-
sions would prohibit agents from o ering a la carte services by
establishing ‘‘minimum service requirements’’ for obtaining and
keeping a broker’s license. As mentioned above, several states are
considering these bills, and some have postponed consideration only
in the face of warnings of their anti-competitive e ects from the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The ex-
perience of Illinois and Texas (which have passed minimum service
statutes), Missouri, Oklahoma, and other states suggests this trend
was actively supported by the state Realtor associations and is likely
still underway. In a memo to state Realtor associations, the NAR
general counsel stated that federal competition authorities can do
little since state legislative actions are insulated from the federal
antitrust laws under the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine.
68
The argument for maintaining service requirements as a condi-
tion for having a license is not persuasive. Licenses exist to ensure a
standard of service quality in a given profession, but there is no rea-
son to believe that agents who o er more narrowly tailored services
and charge accordingly will do any worse of a job or harm consum-
ers in any way. To the contrary, they have the potential to better
serve consumer demand and make the market for services more
e cient.
69 For example, some home sellers may desire the exposure
the MLS a ords, but feel comfortable handling all other aspects of
the sale themselves. Others may feel con dent showing their home
to buyers and negotiating their own sales price, but want to hire a
68See Evans (2005) for excerpts from NAR general counsel Laurie Janik’s
memo. Janik asserts that ‘‘ ‘antitrust laws were not intended to prevent a state
government, acting in its sovereign capacity, from putting in place those poli-
cies that the state chooses—even if those policies might be anticompetitive.’ ’’
She also defends the right of Realtors to ‘‘ ‘seek action from state legislatures
and state regulatory agencies even if that action would have anticompetitive
e ects.’ ’’ NAR does not have an o cial position on minimum service require-
ments, and Janik maintains that these statements do not ‘‘ ‘suggest that laws
and regulations imposing minimum duties on licensees are anticompetitive,’ ’’
but they certainly suggest NAR’s willingness to support state-level regula-
tions and lobbying e orts that do not promote competition or bene t
consumers.
69Some regulators have cited complaints from buyer agents who have had
to work harder or o er extra service to sellers who opted for discount service,
but needed more help. See, for example, Roberts (2005a). While we agree that
it is not the buyer agent’s job to help an unprepared seller, we believe the mar-
ket can resolve this issue through the emergence of more specialized services,
and that state-mandated services for all agents is likely to cause ine ciencies.
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general, consumers can be expected to be willing to pay for di erent
types of services and levels of service quality. Some may want an
entire bundle that is of very high quality while others may want the
bare minimum.
Thus, minimum service requirements are vehicles for inhibiting
competition from brokers or other specialists who are willing to
provide services more selectively. These potential competitors, who
might charge  at fees or hourly fees for unbundled services, rather
than percentage-based commissions for the entire package, could be
expected to put downward pressure on commission rates. It is true
that the full service brokerage bundle has prevailed in the market for
many years, but it appears to us that more individualized services
have become increasingly popular in the wake of soaring housing
prices and the emergence of the Internet. Whether or not a la carte-
style real estate will catch on more widely remains to be seen, but
there is no rationale for preemptively impeding such competition
other than to protect the interests of those who feel threatened by it.
4) Another way in which legitimate competition is being thwarted
at the state level is through anti-rebate laws. We think that rebating
to the consumer, either directly or through a third party, will have a
positive impact on consumer welfare. The DOJ is essentially mak-
ing this point in suing the Kentucky real estate commission for
blocking rebates.
70 We see no compelling economic rationale for
not allowing rebates as they represent a form of price competition
that should improve e ciency by putting pressure on brokerages to
provide better services at lower prices. Again, it may turn out that
higher commissions are necessary to ensure the quality of service
most customers want; this result, however, should be determined by
consumers and producers via the market, rather than real estate com-
missioners via rules that may be anticompetitive.
5) Lastly, NAR has strongly opposed the entrance of banks into
the real estate brokerage market, further shielding its members from
legitimate competition via political lobbying. In 2001, the Federal
Reserve Board proposed that real estate brokerage be added as a
permissible activity for  nancial holding companies to engage in
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
71 But Congressional
action, mounted at the behest of the brokerage industry, has repeat-
70See Department of Justice (2005a).
71See Federal Reserve (2001).
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ing any regulatory change.
72
The brokerage industry’s main argument in opposition is that
brokerage is a commercial, rather than a  nancial, activity and thus
should be o  limits to  nancial holding companies.
73 But this is
misplaced. Brokering the sale of a house is fundamentally no di er-
ent than brokering insurance or securities. Both of the latter are
permissible activities for  nancial holding companies. Indeed,
hundreds of  nancial organizations have brokerage a liates. If
banks can sell insurance on homes, why can’t they broker their sale?
In summary, the various e orts of the NAR and local real estate
boards are best understood in terms of rent-seeking. We don’t blame
the traditional bricks-and-mortar industry for trying to protect its
turf. After all, its members are acting rationally to maximize their
pro ts. But policy makers should focus on setting ground rules that
will work best for consumers.
7. What Should Be Done?
We o er three broad policy recommendations: one related to ef-
fective oversight of possible anti-competitive activities, a second re-
lated to state-level actions that are likely to cause ine ciencies, and
a third related to introducing more competition by allowing banks
to enter into this industry through the use of a liates.
Recommendation 1: Federal and state antitrust authorities should
carefully scrutinize e orts to limit competition in the residential
real estate brokerage market.
Federal authorities have an important role to play and are increas-
ingly playing this role. The claims that real estate sales are purely
intrastate activities and should be regulated only by the states can-
not withstand scrutiny. Millions of people move across state lines
72Congress has approved a one-year ban on  nancial holding companies’
entering the real estate market each year since 2001. This year, both the Sen-
ate and the House are considering bills to permanently ban banks from
participating in real estate brokerage. See Roth (2005).
73See NAR (2001) for a full description of NAR’s opposition to the sug-
gested rule change allowing banks to participate in real estate brokerage. It
has voiced similar resistance in each subsequent year as the rule has been
reconsidered. See U.S. House of Representatives (2005).
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74 It is perfectly appropriate
for federal competition authorities to investigate and prosecute anti-
competitive actions taken not only by the industry’s national trade
association, but also activities at the state level, and to urge state
lawmakers and regulators to act in a way that promotes competition
in real estate brokerage. Investigations by bodies such as the Federal
Trade Commission and the Government Accountability O ce can
also be helpful in educating legislators and the general public on
these issues.
75
The Department of Justice is right to show concern about NAR’s
rules governing online listings and is also right in attempting to
persuade states that prohibitions on rebates are inappropriate. The
Department also seems on solid ground in urging state legislatures
not to erect new hurdles to competition—for example, by banning
or limiting a la carte services—even though the federal government
may lack the authority to overrule state legislation.
76
If the evidence of anti-competitive rules or practices by local
MLSs is true, state attorneys general could also pursue legal action.
They could use antitrust law, as well as state and common law
regarding the  duciary duty of agents to their principals.
A key feature of any policy related to the MLS is that it should
not discriminate against legitimate market players. Currently, the
most important concern is that rules governing entry and operation
do not discriminate against online brokers or brokers that deviate
from the traditional bricks-and-mortar model. We believe that selec-
tive opt-out rules and constraints on network models constitute such
discrimination. While discrimination based on the cost of providing
the service may be reasonable, discrimination that is unrelated to
operation costs and that may negatively impact competition should
74According to the Census Bureau, about 7.6 million people moved to a dif-
ferent state in 2003, typical of the national average over the past 20 years. See
Francese (2004).
75The Federal Trade Commission conducted hearings on barriers to Internet
commerce in 2003, the outcome of which helped in part to bring about the
recent Supreme Court decision facilitating interstate wine sales. See FTC
(2002). The Government Accountability O ce is expected to conduct a study
on real estate competition later this year. See Risen (2005).
76While we feel it is appropriate and economically bene cial for federal
authorities to try to prevent anti-competitive actions by states, we recognize
that there are limits to what federal authorities may be able to accomplish
(since the antitrust laws permit even anti-competitive state statutes under the
‘‘state action’’ doctrine).
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with antitrust law.
77
We recognize that under the current system, brokers are entitled
to some control over their listings. One possible outcome of allow-
ing more brokers into the MLS, or allowing listings to be more
widely displayed, is that some of the bigger brokers will no longer
participate in the MLS system. However, companies that withdraw
will risk losing employees and customers who value the bene ts of
sharing listings. Thus, we think the dissolution of the current MLS
system is unlikely unless a more attractive alternative presents itself.
Over time, we hope that this platform, or any possible replacement,
will evolve to better meet the needs of Internet-savvy consumers.
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Recommendation 2: State legislatures and real estate commissions
should refrain from adopting laws or rules that inhibit competition
in real estate brokerage.
Some policies that have been pursued by state governments are
likely to limit competition in this market. In particular, rebate bans
and minimum service requirements inhibit the emergence of in-
novative models with alternative price and service o erings.
We realize that local real estate associations can wield signi cant
political power at the state level. But now that the Justice Depart-
ment has put a spotlight on the industry at the national level, we are
hopeful that elected o cials and the regulators they appoint will
weigh more seriously the economic consequences of their actions,
and resist enacting rules that protect incumbents at the expense of
consumers.
Recommendation 3: Congress should not prevent the Federal
Reserve Board and the Treasury Department from allowing banks
too erresidentialrealestatebrokerageservicesthroughseparately
capitalized a liates.
77This framework is supported by past cases that have considered this issue.
See U.S. v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) and Thompson v.
Metropolitan Multi-List, 934 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1991).
78Currently, many online MLSs require potential buyers to go through a
seller’s broker in order to inquire about a listing, e ectively forcing additional
help that sellers may or may not want. By contrast, other Internet platforms
such as Craigslist.org allow consumers to post housing or other o erings and
contact each other directly to make transactions. Future services like these
have begun to serve real estate needs and could continue to do so on a broader
basis, disaggregating control of the listings from the agents providing negotiat-
ing, contracting or other services.
110 REAL ESTATE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 35: 86 2006]Federal authorities can and should enhance competition in real
estate brokerage by authorizing banks to engage in this activity
through separately capitalized a liates. The Department of the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, which have joint power
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of
1999 to authorize  nancial holding companies to enter businesses
that are  nancial in nature.
Banking and broader  nancial organizations are natural entrants
into real estate brokerage. They have a natural clientele—their home
borrowers. Any concerns that banks might subsidize their real estate
activities have already been addressed by the holding company
structure mandated by the 1999 Act, through which banks are al-
lowed to a liate with permissible non-banking organizations only
through separately capitalized a liates.
We cannot predict how much commissions would come down if
 nancial holding companies entered the brokerage industry, but the
additional competition is likely to put downward pressure on rates
and stimulate innovation. The  nancial authorities should renew
their e orts to drop this anti-competitive barrier that inhibits
competition.
79 The bene ts of entry would be additional to those
from intensi ed competition from Internet-based and discount
brokers.
As for Congress, it should let the regulators do what they were
authorized to do. Up to now, the real estate industry has success-
fully persuaded Congress to prevent regulators from allowing
 nancial holding companies to enter the housing brokerage market.
Given the ongoing changes in the industry, and speci cally the
Justice Department’s antitrust investigation, Congressional repre-
sentatives who have traditionally sided with the real estate broker-
age lobby have good reason to keep their distance now. There is no
defense for a Congress ostensibly interested in limiting the tax
burden on Americans to defend what amounts to an arti cial ‘‘tax’’
on home buyers resulting from an industry that has yet to take full
advantage of the digital revolution.
79Congressional hearings held by the House Committee on Financial Ser-
vices in June 2005 were an encouraging step toward promoting valuable com-
petition from banks in real estate. See U.S. House of Representatives (2005).
We hope that further action will be taken to overcome the consistent Congres-
sional support of this barrier to competition.
BRINGING MORE COMPETITION TO REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 111***
The preceding analysis suggests that the traditional model for
residential real estate brokerage services may be dated, and could be
improved substantially with some public policy interventions that
spur innovation. Unfortunately, there are numerous barriers to entry
that are slowing the emergence of new models for serving
consumers. Moreover, some of these barriers are likely to be anti-
competitive and violate antitrust laws.
We do not know which models are likely to succeed in the mar-
ket place for residential real estate services in the future. We do
believe, however, that judicious public policy interventions could
have a marked impact on improving services and lowering costs for
home buyers and sellers.
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